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There  are  not  many  opportunities  for  decisive  tests  in  macroeconomics. 
Econometric evidence is useful, but time-series data accumulates only slowly (at 
a  rate  of  four  quarterly  observation  per  year)  and,  in  a  global  economy, 
observations  on  different  countries  cannot  necessarily  be  regarded  as 
independent.  Many  economic  variables  are  potentially  relevant,  and  many 
different models and statistical techniques can be applied to any given problem, 
commonly with differing results. As a result, robust statistical conclusions on 
contentious macroeconomic issues are hard to find.
Major changes in thought about macroeconomic issues tend to arise, not from the 
patient  accumulation  of  evidence,  but  from  the  experience  of  economic  crises 
which refute (or seem to refute) established views. Sometimes the effect is to 
confirm alternative views that are already well-developed, but more often the 
need for new theoretical developments becomes apparent.
The  experience  of  the  Great  Depression  discredited,  almost  completely,  what 
Keynes called the Classical view, based on Say’s Law, that an economy subject to 
unemployment  would  automatically  and  rapidly  return  to  full  employment 
equilibrium  (in  the  absence  of  minimum  wages  or  union  monopolies). 
Keynes’ (1936), General Theory of Employment Interest and Money provided the 
theoretical basis for an alternative.
Similarly, the stagflation of the late 1960s and early 1970s discredited the school 
of  Keynesian  macroeconomic  management  based  on  the  exploitation  of  the 
Phillips curve. Theoretical responses drew on Friedman’s (1968) observation of 
the crucial role of expectations.
The US recession is now a little over a year old, and the global financial crisis it 
generated about six months old.   In such a short time, and with new shocks 2
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occurring almost daily, it is too early to attempt a comprehensive assessment of 
the impact of the crisis on economic thought. Nevertheless, a number of widely 
held  doctrines  concerning  economic  theory  and  economic  policy  have  been 
refuted, or at least rendered highly problematic by the global financial crisis. 
This paper presents observations on six such doctrines, namely:
#1 The efficient markets hypothesis;
#2 The Great Moderation;
#3: Central bank independence;
#4 Trickle down;
#5 The case for privatisation; and
#6 Individual retirement accounts.
Following  the  discussion  of  these  doctrines,  some  concluding  thoughts  are 
offered.
1. The efficient (financial) markets hypothesis
Broadly  speaking,  the  efficient  markets  hypothesis  says  that  the  prices 
generated by financial markets represent the best possible estimate of the values 
of the underlying assets (Fama 1970).
The hypothesis comes in three forms.
The weak version (which stands up well, though not perfectly, to empirical 
testing) says that it is impossible to predict future movements in asset prices 
on  the  basis  of  past  movements,  in  the  manner  supposedly  done  by 
sharemarket  chartists.  An  immediate  implication  is  that  prices  follow  a 
random walk. While most short-run and medium-run evidence supports the 
random walk hypothesis, there is some evidence of longer-term reversion to 
mean  values  that  may  violate  the  weak  form  of  the  efficient  markets 
hypothesis. (Poterba and Summers 1988).3
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The  strong  version,  which  gained  considerable  credence  during  the  financial 
bubble  era  says  that  asset  prices  represent  the  best  possible  estimate  taking 
account of all information, both public and private.
1 Difficult as it is to bury a 
failed intellectual doctrine, it seems unlikely that the strong form of the efficient 
markets hypothesis is going to be taken seriously in the foreseeable future, given 
the magnitude of asset pricing failures revealed by the financial crisis.
For most policy issues, the relevant version of the efficient markets hypothesis is 
the ‘semi-strong’ version which says that asset prices are at least as good as any 
estimate  that  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  publicly  available  information.  It 
follows, in the absence of distorting taxes or other market failures that the best 
way to allocate scarce capital and other resources is to seek to maximise the 
market value of the associated assets. Another way of presenting the semi-strong 
efficient markets hypothesis is to say that, regardless of whether markets are 
perfectly  efficient,  they  are  better  than  any  other  feasible  method  of  capital 
allocation.
The  efficient  markets  hypothesis  can  be  tested  in  various  ways.  First,  it  is 
possible to undertake econometric tests of its predictions. Most obviously, the 
weak form of the hypothesis precludes the existence of predictable patterns in 
asset prices (unless predictability is so low that transactions costs exceed the 
profits that could be gained by trading on them). This test is generally passed, at 
least with respect to the trading strategies commonly recommend by ‘chartists’ 
and ‘technical analysts’, though anomalies such as mean reversion remain. On 
the other hand, a number of studies have suggested that the volatility of asset 
prices  is  greater  than  is  predicted  by  semi-strong  and  strong  forms  of  the 
hypothesis (Shiller 1989).
While  econometric  tests  can  be  given  a  rigorous  justification,  they  are  rarely 
conclusive, since it is usually possible to get somewhat different results with a 
1    It  was  this  claim  that  lay  behind  the  proposal  put  forward  in  2005  for  ‘terrorism  futures 
markets’, in which participants would bet on the likelihood of terror attacks. (Hansen 2006). 4
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different specification or a different data set. Most people are more likely to form 
their views on the efficient markets hypothesis on the basis of beliefs about the 
presence or absence of ‘bubbles’ in asset prices, that is, periods in which prices 
move steadily further and further away from underlying values. For those who 
still  believed  the  efficient  markets  hypothesis,  the  recent  crisis  should  have 
shaken their faith greatly. But, although the consequences were less severe, the 
‘dotcom’ bubble of the late 1990s was, in many respects, a more clear-cut and 
convincing example of an asset price bubble. Anyone could see, and many said, 
that  this  was  a  bubble,  but  those,  like  George  Soros,  who  tried  to  profit  by 
shortselling lost their money when the bubble lasted longer than expected.
More important than asset markets themselves is their role in the allocation of 
investment. As Keynes (1936, p. 159) observed, this job is likely to be ill-done 
when  it  is  a  by-product  of  the  activities  of  a  casino.  So,  if  the  superficial 
resemblance of asset markets to gigantic casinos reflects reality, we would expect 
to  see  distortions  in  patterns  of  savings  and  investment.  The  dotcom  bubble 
provides  a  good  example,  with  around  a  trillion  dollars  of  investment  capital 
being poured into speculative investments. Some of this was totally dissipated, 
while much of the remainder was used in a massive, and premature, expansion 
of the capacity of optical fibre networks
2. Eventually, most of this ‘dark fibre’ 
bandwidth  was  taken  up,  but,  in  investment  allocation,  timing  is  just  as 
important as project selection.
The dotcom bubble was just one component of a massive asset price bubble that 
began in the early 1990s and is only now coming to an end. Throughout this 
period, patterns of savings and investment made little sense. Household savings 
plunged to zero and below in a number of developed countries (including nearly 
all English-speaking countries) and the resulting current account deficits were 
met  by  borrowing  from  rapidly  growing  countries  like  China.  The  standard 
theory of international finance would suggest that capital flows should go in the 
2 The fraudulent claims of Worldcom played a big role here5
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other  direction.  The  massive  growth  of  the  financial  sector  itself,  which 
accounted  for  nearly  half  of  all  corporate  profits  by  the  end  of  the  bubble, 
diverted physical and particularly human capital from the production of goods 
and services.
Finally, it is useful to look at the actual operations of the financial sector. Even 
the strongest advocates of the efficient markets hypothesis would not seek to 
apply it to, say, the Albanian financial sector in the 1990s, which was little more 
than  a  series  of  Ponzi  schemes.  They  have  however,  argued  that  the 
sophisticated global financial markets of today, with the multiple safeguards of 
domestic and international financial regulation, private sector ratings agencies 
and  the  teams  of  analysts  employed  by  Wall  Street  investment  banks  is  not 
susceptible to such systemic problems, and is capable of correcting them quickly 
as  they  arise,  without  any  need  for  large-scale  and  intrusive  government 
intervention.  Such  claims  do  not  seem  plausible  in  the  light  of  the  massive 
failures  of  all  these  institutions,  and  the  exposure  of  Ponzi  schemes  on  a 
historically unprecedented scale, at the heart of the US financial system.
Once the efficient markets hypothesis is abandoned, it seems likely that markets 
will do better than governments in planning investments in some cases (those 
where a good judgement of consumer demand is important, for example) and 
worse in others (those requiring long-term planning, for example). The logical 
implication is that a mixed economy will outperform both central planning and 
laissez faire, as was indeed the experience of the 20th century.
2.    The ‘Great Moderation’
The ‘Great Moderation’ is a phrase coined by Bernanke (2004) to describe his 
interpretation  of  evidence  presented  by  Blanchard  and  Simon  (2001)  showing 




3. Blanchard and Simon offered both a different view of 
the  evidence  and  a  different  explanation.  They  said  that  output  volatility 
declined from the 1950s
4 to the early 2000s, with an interruption in the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, they note that the data could also be interpreted as having 
a single structural break in the mid-1980s, and this is the view of the evidence 
taken by Bernanke.
A variety of explanations have been put forward for the Great Moderation. To 
the extent that the Moderation has been seen as more than a run of good luck, it 
has  been  explained  either  by  improvements  in  macroeconomic  management 
associated or as result of the benefits of economic liberalism. A popular account 
was given by Baker (2007):
        Economists  are  debating  the  causes  of  the  Great 
Moderation enthusiastically and, unusually, they are in broad 
agreement. Good policy has played a part: central banks have 
got much better at timing interest rate moves to smooth out 
the  curves  of  economic  progress.  But  the  really  important 
reason  tells  us  much  more  about  the  best  way  to  manage 
economies.
    It is the liberation of markets and the opening-up of choice 
that lie at the root of the transformation. The deregulation of 
financial  markets  over  the  Anglo-Saxon  world  in  the  1980s 
had a damping effect on the fluctuations of the business cycle. 
These  changes  gave  consumers  a  vast  range  of  financial 
instruments  (credit  cards,  home  equity  loans)  that  enabled 
them to match their spending with changes in their incomes 
over long periods. 
On his retirement as a columnist for The Times of London, Baker (2009) noted 
that these claims had proved false and nominated this column as ‘my biggest 
intellectually missed opportunity’.
3  This was not true of Japan, where the bubble economy of the 1980s and the ensuing financial 
crisis resulted in increased volatility compared to the steady growth of earlier periods.
4 Reliable national accounts were not available before this period. However, output volatility was obviously 
high in the 1920s and 1930s, so the ‘Moderation’ hypothesis may be extended to include these decades.7
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The  Great  Moderation  has  vanished  with  surprising  rapidity,  though  in 
retrospect its unsustainability has been evident since the late 1990s. The current 
global recession will generate a substantial increase in the volatility of output. 
But even if the recession ends by  late 2009, as is suggested by some optimistic 
forecasters, crucial elements of the Great Moderation hypothesis have already 
been refuted. Over the period of the Great Moderation, all the major components 
of aggregate output (consumption, investment and public spending) became more 
stable. By contrast, if a deep recession is avoided in 2009, this will be the result 
of a massive fiscal stimulus, with a huge increase in public expenditure (net of 
taxes) offsetting large reductions in private sector demand.
Just as the failure of the efficient markets hypothesis has destroyed much of the 
theoretical  basis  of  the  policy  framework  dominant  in  recent  decades,  the 
collapse of the Great Moderation has destroyed the pragmatic justification that, 
whatever the inequities and inefficiencies involved in the process, the shift to 
economic  liberalism  since  the  1970s  delivered  sustained  prosperity  (see  the 
section on Trickle Down). If anything can be salvaged from the current mess, it 
will be in spite of the policies of recent decades and not because of them.
3. Central bank independence
The idea that central banks can and should act independently of governments is, 
fairly clearly, inoperative for the duration of the crisis in many countries. The 
combination  of  massively  increased  liquidity  provision  and  large-scale  bank 
bailouts  requires  close  co-ordination  between  central  banks  and  national 
treasuries,  though  the  form  of  this  co-ordination  is  inevitably  different  in 
different countries.
But the implications of the crisis for central bank independence go much deeper 
than  this.  The  idea  behind  the  move  to  central  bank  independence  was  that 
monetary policy should be left to independent experts, and should be the main 
tool for macroeconomic stabilisation. Governments were expected to avoid active 8
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fiscal  policy,  focusing  primarily  on  maintaining  budget  balance
5.  The  shift  to 
independent central banking was closely associated with the adoption (implicit 
or explicit) of inflation targets as the primary focus of monetary policy, and with 
interest rates as the primary tool.
Not much of this appears sustainable in the light of the global financial crisis. 
Inflation targeting failed to prevent unsustainable asset price booms, and it now 
seems clear that these could not have been prevented without much more direct 
control  over  unsound  financial  innovations.  That’s  a  task  where  interaction 
between governments and central banks appears unavoidable. On the one hand, 
expertise is crucial. On the other hand, as with war, financial innovation is too 
important, and too dangerous, to be left to finance experts.
The  idea  that  monetary  policy  alone  is  sufficient  for  macroeconomic  stability 
might have looked appealing during the Great Moderation, but does not stand up 
when  examined  over  a  longer  period.  To  put  it  bluntly,  central  bank 
independence appears to work well except when it is most needed.
A more difficult question relates to the separation between monetary policy and 
prudential regulation. The need to take systematic risk into account suggests 
that monetary policy must be closely integrated with prudential policy. On the 
other hand, Australia, with a clear separation between monetary and prudential 
regulators has done better than countries where central banks are more closely 
involved. Arguably, the correct separation is between strategic issues, such as 
monitoring of systemic risk and the regulation of financial innovations, which 
belongs with the central bank, and institution-level supervision, which belongs 
with a specialist agency.
5 There were some differences in view as to whether governments should target annual balance, 




The idea that policies favorable to the wealthy, such as financial deregulation 
and favorable tax treatment of capital income, will ultimately benefit everybody 
has been described, pejoratively, as ‘trickle down’ economics.
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Regardless of semantics, ‘trickle down’ economics is one of the casualties of the 
financial crisis. Particularly in the United States, the spectacular growth in the 
share  of  income  accruing  to  the  owners  and  senior  managers  of  financial 
enterprise, and to those in the top percentile of the income distribution more 
generally, has been justified on the basis that all members of the community 
would eventually benefit from this process.
Now that the economic expansion associated with the ‘Great Moderation’ is over, 
it is possible to assess this claim in the light of US experience  since the economic 
crisis of the early 1970s. In this period, US GDP has grown strongly, and the 
incomes  and  wealth  of  the  richest  Americans  has  grown  spectacularly.  By 
contrast, the gains to households in the middle of the income distribution have 
been  much  more  modest.  Between  1973  (the  last  year  of  the  long  postwar 
expansion) and 2007, median household income rose from $44 000 to just over 
$50 000, an annual rate of increase of 0.4 per cent. 
Household  size  has  decreased,  mainly  due  to  declining  birth  rates.  The  most 
appropriate  measure  of  household  size  for  the  purpose  of  assessing  living 
standards is the number of ‘equivalent adults’ derived from a formula that takes 
account of the fact that children cost less to feed and clothe than adults and that 
two  or  more  adults  living  together  can  do  so  more  cheaply  than  adults  in 
separate households.  The average household contained 1.86 equivalent adults in 
1974 and 1.68 equivalent adults in 2007 (my calculations on US census data). 
6 The same idea been summed up, more positively, in the aphorism ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’ a 
phrase  popularised  John  F  Kennedy  (1963).Kennedy  used  the  term  to  defend  a  dam  project 
against the claim that it represented ‘pork barrel’ expenditure, and that this phrase is also used 
in the context of debates over free trade and over the effects of macroeconomic expansion. While 
it  generally  implies  that  we  should  focus  on  expanding  aggregate  income  without  too  much 
concern over distribution, it is less sharply focused than the ‘trickle down’  pejorative.10
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Income  per  equivalent  adult  rose  at  an  annual  rate  of  0.7  per  cent  over  this 
period.
For those at the bottom of the income distribution, there have been no gains at 
all. Unlike the situation in Australia and other countries where a poverty line is 
defined in relative terms, as a proportion of average income, the United States 
has  a  poverty  line  fixed  in  real  terms,  and  based  on  an  assessment  of  a 
minimally acceptable standard of living undertaken in 1963. 
The proportion of Americans below this fixed poverty line fell from 25 per cent in 
the late 1950s to 11 per cent in 1974. Since then it has fluctuated, reaching 12.5 
per cent in 2007, a level that is certain to rise as a result of the financial crisis 
and recession now taking place. Since the poverty line has remained unchanged, 
this means that the incomes accruing to the poorest 10 per cent of Americans 
have actually fallen over the last 30 years.
Other measures yield similar conclusions. Median earnings for full-time year-
round male workers have not grown since 1974. Women have done a little better, 
with median earnings for full-time year-round workers rising by about 0.9 per 
year over this period. 
Overall,  the  main  factors  sustaining  growth  in  living  standards  for  American 
households outside the top 20 per cent have been an increase in the labour force 
participation of women and a decline in household savings. Over the period since 
1999,  consumption  financed  by  borrowing  against  home  equity  has  been  the 
main factor offsetting stagnant or declining median household incomes.
Thus, in statistical terms, evidence from the United States offers little support to 
the trickle down theory. It is equally important, however, to look at how the 
theory is supposed to work. The general idea is that the more highly owners of 
capital and highly-skilled managers are rewarded, the more productive they will 
be. This will lead both to the provision of goods and services at lower cost and to 11
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higher demand for the services of less-skilled workers who will therefore earn 
higher wages.
The  financial  sector  is  the  obvious  test  case  for  this  theory.  Incomes  in  the 
financial sector have risen more rapidly than in any other part of the economy, 
and have played a major role in bidding up the incomes of senior managers and 
professionals  in  related  fields  such  as  law  and  accounting.  According  to  the 
trickle-down  theory,  the  growth  in  income  accruing  to  the  financial  sector 
benefitted the US population as a whole in three main ways.
First, the facilitation of takeovers, mergers and buyouts by private equity firms 
offered the opportunity to increase the efficiency with which capital was used, 
and the productivity of the economy as a whole.
Second, expanded provision of credit to households allowed higher standards of 
living to be enjoyed, as households could ride out fluctuations in income, bring 
forward  the  benefits  of  future  income  growth,  and  draw  on  the  capital  gains 
associated with rising prices for stocks, real estate and other assets.
Finally,  there  is  the  classic  ‘trickle-down’  effect  in  which  the  wealth  of  the 
financial sector generates demands for luxury goods and services of all kinds, 
thereby  benefitting  workers  in  general,  or  at  least  those  in  cities  with  high 
concentrations of financial centre activity such as London and New York.
The bubble years from the early 1990s to 2007 gave some support to all of these 
claims. Measured US productivity grew strongly in the 1990s, and moderately in 
the years after 2000. Household consumption also grew strongly, and inequality 
in  consumption  was  much  less  than  inequality  in  income  or  wealth.  And, 
although income growth was weak for most households, rates of unemployment 
were low, at least by post-1970 standards for most of this period.
Very little of this is likely to survive the financial crisis. At its peak, the financial 
sector (finance, insurance and real estate) accounted for around 18 per cent of 12
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GDP and a much larger share of GDP growth. With professional and business 
services included, the total share was over 30 per cent.
7 The finance and business 
services sector is now contracting, and it is clear that a significant part of the 
output  measured  in  the  bubble  years  was  illusory.  Many  investments  and 
financial transactions made during this period have already proved disastrous, 
and  many  more  seem  likely  to  do  so  in  coming  years.    In  the  process,  the 
apparent  productivity  gains  generated  through  the  expansion  of  the  financial 
sector will be lost.
The failure of the trickle-down approach has been even more severe in relation to 
consumer finance. The idea that increasing income inequality was unimportant 
when  households  could  borrow  to  finance  growing  consumption  was  never 
defensible.  The  gap  between  income  and  consumption  had  to  be  filled  by  a 
massive increase in debt. With sufficiently optimistic assumptions about social 
mobility (that low-income households were in that state only temporarily) and 
asset  appreciation  (that  the  stagnation  of  median  incomes  would  be  offset  by 
capital gains on houses and other investments)  these increases in debt could be 
made  to  appear  manageable,  but  once  asset  prices  stopped  rising  they  were 
shown to be unsustainable.
In  the  US  context,  these  contradictions  have  been  resolved  for  individual 
households  by  a  massive  increase  in  financial  breakdowns.  Until  2005,  this 
mainly  took  the  form  of  a  steady  increase  in  bankruptcy,  to  the  point  where 
Americans were more likely to go bankrupt than to get divorced.   Restrictive 
reforms introduced at the behest of the credit card industry produced a dramatic 
drop in bankruptcy rates which was, in part, the lagged counterpart of a massive 
upsurge in 2003 and 2004 as people rushed to declare bankruptcy under the old 
7 As measured by the ratio of gross FBS output to gross domestic product, which is the figure 
most relevant to the argument. The value-added in FRB (which nets out inputs purchased by the 
FRB sector) is smaller, around 20 per cent, but still indicates a highly financialised economy.13
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rules.  From  2006,  onwards,  bankruptcy  rates  resumed  their  upward  trend, 
reaching 1.1 million per year in 2008.
This trend attracted little attention as bankruptcies were rapidly overshadowed 
by  foreclosures  on  home  mortgages.  During  the  boom,  when  overstretched 
householders could normally sell at a profit and repay their debts, foreclosures 
were rare. From 2007 onwards, however, they increased dramatically, initially 
among  low-income  ‘subprime’  borrowers  but  spreading  ever  more  broadly.  2.3 
million houses were affected by foreclosure action in 2008. In hard-hit areas of 
California, more than 5 per cent of houses went into foreclosure in a single year
As in other respects, the longer-run implications of the crisis have yet to be fully 
comprehended. Even when economic activity recovers, consumer credit will be 
far more restricted than in past decades. As a result, there will be no escape from 
the implications of decades of stagnant wages for workers at the median and 
below.
Politically,  the  failure  of  the  trickle-down  theory  seems  likely  to  produce  a 
resurgence of the class-based politics pronounced dead in the era of economic 
liberalism. The contrast between the enforced austerity of any recovery period, 
and the massive, and massively unjustified, excesses of the financial elite during 
the  boom  period,  will  produce  a  political  environment  where  phrases  like 
“malefactors of great wealth” no longer seem quaint and old fashioned. 
5. The case for privatisation
The  large-scale  privatisation  of  publicly-owned  enterprises  both  in  capitalist 
countries like the UK and Australia and in formerly communist countries after 
1989 played a big role in promoting the kind of triumphalism that characterised 
much  commentary  about  free-market  capitalism,  particularly  in  the  1990s 
(Friedman 1999, Fukuyama 1992).14
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The case for privatisation had two main elements. First, there was the fiscal 
argument  for  privatisation,  namely,  that  governments  could  improve  their 
financial  position  by  selling  government  business  enterprises.  This  argument 
assumed  that  privately  owned  firms  would  have  higher  levels  of  operating 
efficiency,  and  therefore  that  the  value  of  those  firms  would  be  increased  by 
privatisation. The second argument was a dynamic one, that the allocation of 
capital between alternative investments would be improved if governments were 
not  involved  in  the  process.  Both  of  these  arguments  have  been  fatally 
undermined by the collapse of the efficient markets hypothesis.
The fiscal case for privatisation must be assessed on a case by case basis. It will 
always be true for example that if a public enterprise is operating at a loss, and 
can be sold off for a positive price with no strings attached, the government’s 
fiscal  position  will  benefit  from  privatisation.  Some  early,  and  unsuccessful, 
ventures  in  public  ownership,  such  as  the  state  butcher  shops  operated  in 
Queensland  in  the  1920s  met  this  criterion,  and  there  is  little  interest  in 
repeating such experiments. 
For most recent privatisations in developed countries, however, the sale price 
has been less than plausible estimates of the value of future earnings, discounted 
at  the  government  bond  rate  (Quiggin  1994,  2003).  The  fiscal  case  for 
privatisation  therefore  rests  on  the  claim,  derived  from  the  efficient  markets 
hypothesis,  that  the  correct  discount  rate  to  use  is  one  based  on  the  private 
sector cost of capital and therefore dominated by the expected rate of return to 
equity capital (Domberger 1995).
The  choice  of  discount  rate  makes  a  difference  because  the  rate  of  return  to 
equity has historically been much higher than the rate of interest on government 
bonds, a gap that can’t be explained by standard economic arguments about risk 
premiums.  Although  many  explanations  of  this  ‘equity  premium  puzzle’  have 15
16
17
been offered (Grant and Quiggin 2005), for present purposes they can be divided 
into two classes
(i) those, such as that of McGrattan and Prescott (2005) which assume that the 
efficient  markets  hypothesis  is  true,  and  imply  that  the  equity  premium  is  a 
correct  reflection  of  economic  risk,  though  possibly  distorted  by  government 
intervention
(ii) those in which the risk premium for equity reflects failures in equity markets 
that  lead  people  to  prefer  holding  bonds,  as  discussed  by  Grant  and  Quiggin 
(2003, 2004)
In the light of the global financial crisis and the events leading up to it, the case 
for explanations of type (ii) is overwhelmingly strong.
The dynamic case for privatisation is based on the idea that the allocation of 
investment  will  be  better  undertaken  by  private  firms  than  by  government 
business  enterprises.  This  claim  in  turn  relies  on  the  assumption  that  the 
evaluation  of  risk  and  returns  undertaken  by  investment  banks,  with  the 
assistance of ratings agencies, and the availability of sophisticated markets for 
derivatives like CDOs will be far superior than anything that could be obtained 
by,  for  example,  using  engineering  calculations  of  the  need  for  investment  in 
various  kinds  of  infrastructure,  and  seeking  to  implement  the  resulting 
investment plans on a co-ordinated basis. 
The  asset  revaluations  associated  with  the  global  financial  crisis  have  shown 
that, for most of the past decade, market estimates of the relative riskiness and 
return  of  alternative  investments  have  been  entirely  unrelated  to  reality.  In 
particular,  where  the  decision  processes  associated  with  Byzantine  corporate 
structures like that of the Babcock and Brown group, lauded until recently as 
‘innovative financial engineering, have determined the allocation of investment, 
the result, has been less than satisfactory.16
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It  should  not  be  necessary  to  rebut  the  fallacious  claim  that,  if  the  case  for 
privatisation  developed  in  the  1980s  were  invalid,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
advocate public ownership of all enterprises. Nevertheless experience of debate 
on this question suggests that a rebuttal is required.
If the public sector has lower costs of capital, while the private sector has (at 
least  in  a  wide  range  of  activities)  lower  operating  costs  and  greater 
responsiveness to consumer demand, the optimal economic structure will involve 
public ownership of some firms and private ownership of others, that is, a mixed 
economy.  It  is  those  who  argue  that  the  cost-of-capital  advantage  of  publicly 
owned  firms  should  be  disregarded  who  derive  the  extreme  and  paradoxical 
conclusion that the success of the mixed economy over many decades should be 
disregarded on the basis of purely theoretical arguments.
6. Individual retirement accounts
The news that, on average, superannuation investments lost nearly 20 per cent 
of their value last year comes as no surprise, and it is likely that there are plenty 
of unrealised losses still on the books. While the losses on the stockmarket have 
been  as  severe,  we  can  take  some  comfort  in  the  fact  that  Australian 
superannuation  funds,  like  Australian  banks,  don’t  seem  to  be  in  the  same 
trouble  as  some  of  their  overseas  counterparts.  It’s  natural  to  ask  what,  if 
anything  response  can  and  should  be  done  to  respond  to  the  decline  in 
superannuation wealth.
In the short term, the answer appears to be, nothing, or very little. Fortunately, 
for most people the losses are, in a sense, notional, wiping out the spurious gains 
of  previous  years.  It  is  only  for  those  at  or  near  retirement  that  the  crash 
presents an immediate economic problem. Given that the demand for labour is 
falling sharply, the government may consider an ex gratia payment to workers 17
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who choose to retire now. This is a problematic idea, and in normal times, such a 
proposal would never pass muster, but plainly, the times are not normal.
Looking to the longer view, this is more than a bad year for superannuation 
funds.  The  crash  and  the  way  it  came  about  undermines  the  fundamental 
premise that has driven Australian retirement income policy for the past decade: 
that  allowing  individuals,  with  good  financial  advice,  to  make  their  own 
investment  decisions  on  the  basis  of  defined  contributions  from  employers  to 
personal accounts, is the best way of financing retirement. The old age pension, 
in this view, serves as a residual for those who don’t manage to save enough.
This privatised approach (also represented in Bush’s failed attempt to reform 
Social Security in the US) is has been largely discredited by the crash. Financial 
advisers, even the honest ones, have proved to be useless. Lots of investments 
that  were  marketed  as  low-risk  have  turned  out  to  be  little  more  than  junk. 
Morover, the idea that stocks will always perform better than bonds over the 
medium term (say a decade) has been proved false. This is a central premise of 
long-term investment advice.
We  need  to  look  again  at  the  alternatives:  either  a  return  to  employer-based 
defined  benefit  schemes,  with  portability  of  service,  or  some  kind  of  national 
superannation schemes. In the short term, the call for an increase in the aged 
pension will also gain strength.
Concluding comments
The global financial crisis will have implications for economic thought going far 
beyond those described here. The failure of the efficient markets hypothesis will 
have  ramifications  throughout  economics  and  finance,  and  will  require  a 
thorough rethinking of the analysis of financial regulation. 
The impact on macroeconomics will be equally significant, though much depends 
on the way in which the crisis is resolved. Given the magnitude of the shock, a 18
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rapid return to normality in 2009, before most stimulus funds have been spent, 
would provide substantial support for new classical views of the economy as a 
self-equilibrating system. A recovery beginning in late 2009 or early 2010 would 
give strong support to advocates of Keynesian stimulus. By contrast, a lengthy 
depression would cast doubt on both classical and Keynesian views, and might 
allow for a possible resurgence of heterodox ideas (Marxian, Austrian and post-
Keynesian) that have long been marginalised.
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